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ABSTRACT 
 
Extant research on disruptive innovation has implicitly incorporated entrepreneurship as the 
underlying driver of the disruptive phenomenon. We integrate recent developments from 
entrepreneurship and innovation research streams to better understand the conditions and causal 
mechanisms that influence disruptive innovation. Drawing on effectuation, evolutionary 
entrepreneurship, lead-users, collective intelligence, and opportunity tournament literature, we 
develop a theoretical framework that explains disruptive innovation as a co-evolutionary 
entrepreneurial process at the firm, product, and customer level. The framework offers a set of testable 
propositions to advance theory and practice in the field. We suggest avenues for future research and 
conclude entrepreneurial strategies to help general managers create and cope with disruptive 
innovation. 
 
Keywords: Disruptive Innovation, Entrepreneurship, Effectuation, Lead Users, Collective Intelligence, 
Opportunity Tournaments 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The rise and fall of firms in high technology industries under the umbrella of disruptive innovation 
has been a theme of inquiry that fascinates many scholars in economics, technology management, 
strategy, and among others, from the neoclassical period (Schumpeter, 1934a, 1934b, 1939) to the 
contemporary management era (e.g. Dosi, 1982, Christensen, 1993, 1997, 2006; Collins, 2001; Foster 
and Kaplan, 2001; Adner, 2002). While the business history is replete with examples of successful 
firms and their superior products replaced by competitors and new entrants with less superior products, 
there is a scant attention on what CEOs and general managers can do to better create and cope with 
disruptive innovation. Disruptive innovation reflects the boom and bust of market economy and has 
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 occurred across a wide range of products and industries, including the fast transition from chemical-
based to digital films, analogue to digital and to high-definition televisions; the use of 
nanotechnology-based devices for cancer treatment, and from fossil fuel to renewable energy. 
Importantly, the frequency of such ‘discontinuities’ is increasing (Adner, 2002). 
 
While research on disruptive innovation has flourished in the past decades, this has generally focused 
on the nature and characteristics of the innovation, and its influencing factors to some extent. 
Specifically, little is understood about how and why disruptive innovation occurs and, ultimately, 
what CEOs and general managers can do to better managing the process. Entrepreneurship is critical 
and relevant in the study of disruptive innovation as it involves both competence enhancing and 
destroying elements that often leads to disruptive phenomena, by means of new opportunity discovery 
and exploitation (Shane, 2000), new market creation, new logic (Sarasvathy, 2001, 2008), and new 
resource deployment. Despite the potential contribution of entrepreneurship-related research streams 
to the study and practice of innovation, few researchers have attempted to cross-fertilize the two 
disciplines to advance theory and practice of creating and managing disruptive innovation. We 
integrate the two research streams to answer an important question: what conditions and causal 
mechanisms influence disruptive innovation and therefore how can the disruptive process be managed? 
 
This contribution posits that disruptive innovation is an entrepreneurial process that consists of 
multiple entrepreneurial dimensions at the cognition, action and system level. The process can be 
viewed as an holistic entrepreneurial phenomenon: an outcome of the co-evolution between firms, 
artifacts they create, and entrepreneurial consumers. Our approach to re-conceptualizing disruptive 
innovation builds on the latest research in entrepreneurship including the evolutionary views of 
entrepreneurship, effectuation, lead-user innovation, collective intelligence, and opportunity 
tournament.  
 
This article proceeds with a critical review of the existing literature on disruptive innovation and areas 
which have not received adequate attention in current research. This is followed by a re-
conceptualization of disruptive innovation. We then develop a theoretical framework and advance a 
set of propositions that explains the conditions and causal mechanisms of disruptive innovation from 
an entrepreneurship lens. Our framework offers managerial and policy guidance for general managers 
to create and cope with disruptive innovation. We conclude with avenues for future research and 
discuss implications for managers. 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION: A THEORETICAL REVIEW 
 
The term “disruptive innovation” (see Christensen 1993, 1997, 2006) refers to a new technology that 
has both lower cost and performance in relation to existing dominant design, and takes on a different 
trajectory from mainstream technologies in the market. The key features of disruptive innovation can 
 be reduced to (i) affordability, (ii) simplicity, and consequently, (iii) unexpected replacement of large 
incumbents by new, smaller entrants. Classic examples include the replacement of: bigger by smaller 
disk drives, integrated steel mills by minimills, cassette tapes by compact disks and later by the MP3, 
silver halide film by digital cameras, and many others. To mention a few popular brand names, 
examples include the replacement of Xerox’s high-end copier by low end, less expensive designs by 
Ricoh and Canon (Wright et al., 2004) as well as Digital Equipment Corporation’s personal 
computers by makers of microprocessor based computers, to the threat posed by Samsung to Sony in 
the digital electronics product category (Chang, 2008).  
 
As research in this area evolves and new empirical evidence is discovered (see Danneels, 2004), the 
theory of disruptive innovation also evolves. Some scholars suggest and show evidence that disruptive 
innovation does not necessarily have to be inferior in quality and can also occur from top to bottom, 
aiming at high-end, less price sensitive customers (Utterback and Acee, 2005; Rao et al., 2006). 
Others suggest that prior research has loosely used the term ‘disruption’ and underlined the 
importance of making a conceptual distinction between product and business-model focused types of 
disruptive innovation (Markides, 2006). In a recent review of the state-of-the-art of research in 
disruptive innovation, Christensen (2006) highlighted the value of building normative theory of 
disruption, citing the work of Adner (2002). Nevertheless, research in this area is still pre-occupied 
with building descriptive theory through the development of better typologies and categorization and 
seeking of anomalies considered as disruptive innovation (Christensen, 2006). Importantly, there has 
been little research conducted on strategies that can guide CEOs and general managers to create 
disruptive innovation and/or to protect their businesses from being disrupted in the market. We 
believe that knowledge of and capability to create and cope with disruptive innovation is critical for 
corporate longevity, especially for firms operating in fast changing environment. 
 
To better study disruptive innovation and given the diversity of research and definitions in this area, 
we believe that there is a need to modify Christensen’s original definition of disruptive innovation 
into the following: a phenomenon in which a new product (including service, process, and business 
model) replaces existing dominant design with exceptional commercial success. We argue that 
disruptive innovation cannot be defined from the standpoint of technological success alone but should 
also include market/commercial success.  This modified definition could reconcile conflicting 
definitions and focal points of prior research and bring a focus on the phenomenon where incumbents 
are replaced by 1) new product, 2) unexpected encroachment from the periphery (rather than the 
center) of the existing market, and 3) which results in the attainment of exceptional 
market/commercial success in addition to technological success. 
 
Following from the research question posed in the preceding section, we conducted a systematic 
review of the literature to understand the how and why (i.e. drivers, conditions, causal mechanisms) 
 that influence disruptive innovation. Because innovation is a loosely used term in many published 
articles, we limit the scope of our survey to peer-reviewed literature pertaining to disruptive 
innovation. To identify relevant disruptive innovation articles, we conducted a keyword search on 
ProQuest Business encompassing 1980 to 2011. Keywords included ‘disruptive innovation’, 
‘disruptive technologies’, ‘creative destruction’, ‘radical innovation’, ‘dominant design’, and 
‘Christensen’. This resulted in 184 articles. However we realized that there are many articles that 
frame disruptive innovation only as a context and illustration or proposing a new methodology, or 
proposing a new framework, which are not of our interest (e.g. Currah, 2007 that focuses on 
‘Hollywood and the role of internet’ rather than the how and why of disruptive innovation; or 
Reinhardt and Gurtner, 2011 that focuses on ‘methods’ of customer analysis to develop disruptive 
innovation; or Glazer, 2007 which is a conceptual rather than an empirical paper). We excluded these 
papers from our survey. Research published in edited books (except Christensen’s books and Zeng 
and Williamson’s book on China’s disruptive cost innovation) and conference proceedings was 
excluded as not all of these are accessible and or peer-reviewed.  
 
To ensure thorough coverage, we also conducted a manual review of journals that have editorial 
interest in (disruptive) innovation, for volumes 1980 to 2011, which include Journal of Product 
Innovation Management, R&D Management, Technovation, Research Policy, International Journal of 
Innovation Management, Industrial and Corporate Change, and Technology Analysis & Strategic 
Management. We also manually reviewed Strategic Management Journal, Academy of Management 
Review, Academy of Management Journal, Organization Science, Management Science, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy of Management Perspective, Journal of Management 
Studies, Journal of Management, European Management Journal, Journal of General Management, 
Journal of Marketing, Marketing Science, Sloan Management Review, Harvard Business Review, and 
California Management Review. These are generally considered to be the leading peer reviewed 
journals that frequently publish articles related to innovation and or disruptive innovation. 
 
From this additional survey, we excluded papers that are at the periphery of the domain of disruptive 
innovation and whose focus are not related to the how and why of disruptive innovation, such as 
principles in evaluating disruptive technologies (e.g. Bucher et al., 2003; Hall and Martin, 2005), 
different R&D characteristics of disruptive innovation (e.g. Yu and Hang, 2011), or willingness to 
cannibalize sales/capabilities (e.g. Nijssen et al., 2005), or methods of scenario planning for disruptive 
technology (e.g. Ho and Chen, 2009). 
 
Importantly, from the remaining 45 papers at hand, we then examined them using content analysis and 
through peer reviews identified 14 key papers that are highly relevant to our understanding of the how 
and why (i.e. conditions and causal mechanisms) of disruptive innovation, as shown in Table 1. At 
 this final stage, we are left with 31 articles that are important as they reveal the trends in innovation – 
which form part of our discussion in the next section.  
 
Our analysis on the literature surveyed suggests that the key articles in the field contain elements that 
are strongly relevant to entrepreneurship. As shown in Table 1, the entrepreneurial elements include 
various constructs and research themes such as the trade-offs between effectuation versus causation to 
viewing and managing the market as well as managing resources and developing capabilities; the 
presence and influence of entrepreneurial customers in the market, the effect of entrepreneurship on 
firms’ structure, the role of Entrepreneurial Orientation on performance, entrepreneurial dynamics via 
trial/error and sense making, the influence of prior knowledge on entrepreneurial discovery, and 
exploitation of cross-border entrepreneurial advantage. Therefore, there is a good reason to speculate 
that the entrepreneurship literature may offer contributions to advance the disruptive innovation 
research and offer valuable guidance to managers. However, as shown in the table, to-date the direct 
linkage between the two streams of research has been minimal. 
 
Table 1 goes about here 
 
Our analysis on the papers shown in Table 1 also suggests that there has been an emphasis on 
studying the disruptive phenomenon from either the supply (i.e. firms and the artifacts they create) or 
demand (i.e. customers and their behavior) perspective. This table suggests that the supply perspective 
tends to be more popular in the literature; however, research on the impact of entrepreneurial 
consumers (i.e. demand-side perspective) on disruptiveness is scarce. We also notice that few studies 
attempt to investigate the disruptive innovation phenomenon from both perspectives, i.e. how the 
supply (entrepreneurial firms and their artifacts) and demand (entrepreneurial customers) sides co-
evolve over time. We synthesize these and other important trends and gaps from our survey of the 
literature in the next section. 
 
POTENTIAL DIMENSIONS OF DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION 
 
Our literature survey highlights two important themes or dimensions pertaining to disruptive 
innovation which have not received the attention they deserve in the literature: 1) the role of 
entrepreneurial dynamics and 2) the shift of locus of intelligence and innovation. From this insight, 
we conducted another extensive survey of the entrepreneurship and innovation literatures using the 
same approach described in the preceding literature review section. Our focus was to better 
understand the latest trends and empirical findings that may help us in the conceptualization stage in 
the next section. The two dimensions are discussed next. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Entrepreneurial Elements of Disruption 
 
As a form of Schumpeterian “creative destruction”, disruptive innovation falls squarely within the 
discourse and traditions of entrepreneurship research. Nevertheless, there is a paucity of research in 
this domain that adopts an entrepreneurial lens. There are at least three important elements from 
entrepreneurship research that are not well understood in the context of disruptive innovation: (i) the 
sources of opportunity, (ii) uncertainty in entrepreneurial action, and (iii) entrepreneurial logic. Each 
of them will be discussed below. 
 
Disruptive innovation can be described as a form of entrepreneurial opportunity that is radical rather 
than incremental in nature (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000; Eckhardt and Shane, 2003). This applies 
to product, service, and business-model opportunities, and the definition that we adopt in this article. 
While current research in disruptive innovation has made a distinction between disruptive and 
sustaining innovation, an important question has been left unanswered: a question of where an 
opportunity comes from, i.e. sources of entrepreneurial opportunity. Do entrepreneurial opportunities 
related to disruptive innovation exist, independent of the perceptions of entrepreneurs and waiting to 
be discovered? Or, are these opportunities imagined, enacted, and then created by the actions of 
entrepreneurs? Or else, are they the result of problemistic search by entrepreneurs according to the 
behavioral theory of the firm? Are disruptive innovations easier generated internally or externally? 
These are important questions that entrepreneurship research often asks (see Kirzner, 1997; Shane, 
2000; Alvarez and Barney, 2007; Shepherd et al., 2007).  
 
Importantly, what kind of entrepreneurial opportunities leads to disruptive innovation? Does certain 
form of opportunities tend to lead to disruption than the others? Does it follow a truly revolutionary or 
evolutionary pattern? In other words, understanding the nature of opportunities is critical as it has 
important implications on the effectiveness of a wide variety of entrepreneurial actions in different 
contexts.  
 
Any discussions on entrepreneurship may be incomplete without referring to one of its core concepts: 
uncertainty. Uncertainty is a key element of the theory of entrepreneurial action (McMullen and 
Shepherd, 2006). Entrepreneurship research makes a distinction between “risk”, which is calculable 
and knowable, and “Knightian uncertainty” (or true uncertainty), which is incalculable and 
unknowable (Knight, 1921; Langlois and Cosgel, 1993; Miller, 2007). Questions arise as to what type 
of uncertainty is associated with disruptive innovation opportunity and how entrepreneurs, either 
incumbents or new entrants, perceive and deal with uncertainty. Understanding the nature of 
uncertainty is critical since each type requires different types of entrepreneurial action. Dealing with 
Knightian uncertainty using approaches that are more appropriate for risky situations may lead to 
unprecedented problems, and vice versa.  
 
 The third element rarely mentioned in the current theory of disruptive innovation is decision-making 
logic: causal versus effectual, and how this links to the view of product and market existence (see 
Sarasvathy, 2001; Wiltbank et al., 2006). Christensen’s (2006) statement – “maybe there is something 
about good management that sows the seeds of eventual failure” – could be a reflection of the limits 
of the logic-in-use that hampers large incumbents’ ability to deal with uncertainty created by new, 
small entrants. Which logic to be used relates to the perception and understanding of the nature of 
uncertainty. However, little research has been done to study the interactions between these two 
business logics and their influence on disruptive innovation. 
 
Shift in the Locus of Innovation and Intelligence 
 
Recent shift in the locus of innovation has also received scant attention in the disruptive innovation 
literature. The theory of disruptive innovation has traditionally embraced the notion that well-
established firms (i.e. incumbents) are the epicenter of knowledge and primary sources of innovation. 
This conventional view of innovation is based on the notion of centralized intelligence logic. Recent 
trends towards open (distributed) innovation (see Gassmann et al., 2010; Chesbrough, 2003; 
Christensen, Olesen, and Kjaer, 2005) or the notion of “collective intelligence”, recognizes that the 
“wisdom of the crowds” (Surowiecki, 2005) is generally missing from the theory of disruptive 
innovation. The crowds refer to: (i) the firm as innovator, (ii) the consumer as lead-user innovator, 
and (iii) the innovative consumer (who adopts innovation following the lead-user innovator).  
 
The least explained locus of disruptive innovation among these in the literature is the consumer as 
lead-user innovator, which is growing rapidly in the literature on innovation and technology 
management (Oliveira and Von Hippel, 2011; Von Hippel and Von Krogh, 2003; Von Hippel, 2005). 
These consumers are lead-users whose mind, behaviors, and actions are ahead of the market, possess 
certain advanced technological knowledge, and get involved in user-innovation communities for both 
pecuniary and non-pecuniary motives. Examples include individuals and their communities who 
experiment and develop new ideas leading to the rise of new industries and technologies such as 
mountain biking, kite surfing, surgical equipment, open source software, printed circuit CAD 
(computer-aided design), juvenile products, toys, etc. Simpler, cheaper, and more convenient 
products/services – characteristics of disruptive innovation – are often found in the innovations 
generated by user-innovators.  
 
The fact that large firms increasingly co-innovate with smaller firms and innovative communities 
outside the firm boundary needs to be reconciled with the extant theory of disruptive innovation. 
Firms, such as 3M, IBM, Merck, Intel, Phillips, Lego, and Bang & Olufsen, have capitalized on the 
innovation generated by external innovative entities and generated substantial revenues from this new 
approach in the past decade. Eli Lilly created Innocentive.com, a platform allowing seekers (i.e. firms) 
 and solvers (i.e. lead-users or experts) of technological problems scattered around the world to 
converge. This platform ultimately helps large incumbents find effective technological solutions at a 
much lower cost.  Linux, one of the most successful open source software, is potentially challenging 
Microsoft’s Windows and Sun’s Unix operating systems. In light of the open innovation trend (or 
threat), Sun Microsystems also began experimenting with open innovation through its Open Solaris 
platform in recent years.  
 
The body of work on innovation tournament (see Terwiesch and Ulrich, 2009; Girotra et al., 2010) 
that demonstrates how firms, from large pharmaceutical to award-winning animation house, can 
create and select innovation opportunities from a large pool of external sources (i.e. the crowds) to 
find the best opportunities/ideas is a recent trend that is worth noting. While the best ideas may come 
as an accident or an art, the process of finding the lucky accidents can be better managed scientifically, 
and hence more effectively and efficiently by firms soliciting ideas from the crowds outside. This 
scientific approach to widening the variance of the quality of the opportunities/ideas is the key to 
discovering the lucky accidents. This underlines the growing recognition of the shift of the locus of 
innovation and intelligence from internal to external sources. 
 
In the next section, we will weave the insights from the aforementioned discussions into our 
conceptual framework. 
 
DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION AS A CO-EVOLUTIONARY ENTREPRENEURIAL 
PROCESS: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Drawing on the theory of entrepreneurial logic (Sarasvathy, 2001), the theory of entrepreneurial 
action (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006), as well as the definition of entrepreneurial dynamics 
(McKelvey, 2004), we first define entrepreneurship as the formation of new artifacts at the product 
and firm level that replaces old with new value through entrepreneurial action under conditions of 
uncertainty and change. The artifacts here refer to not-yet-in-existent products (including services and 
business models) which are extremely unique in their degree of novelty (e.g. the creation of electricity, 
internet) to radical improvement of already-in-existence products which are high in their degree of 
newness (e.g. the creation of no-frills airlines, online brokerage, digital cameras, small disk drives and 
MP3) that causes the replacement of incumbents by new entrants.  
 
Disruptive innovation can be considered as a subset of entrepreneurial process where perennial 
conflict between opposing forces (i.e. the defenders versus challengers), logics, and trajectories occurs 
in the formation of new artifacts to replace old with new value. This perennial conflict is an 
underlying cause for what Schumpeter called “creative destruction” in the economy.  
 
 In this section, we propose a new framework that explains the conditions and causal mechanism that 
drive disruptive innovation (see Figure 1). The framework integrates the effectuation theory of 
entrepreneurship, evolutionary entrepreneurship, lead-user innovation, and opportunity tournament 
literature. The framework proposes disruptive innovation as a co-evolutionary entrepreneurial process 
between firms, artifacts they create, and consumers. Each of these evolutionary forces is described 
below. 
 
Figure 1 goes about here 
 
Business-Level Drivers 
 
Effectual and Causal logic  
 
In the proposed framework, the clash between causal and effectual logic among market players is an 
important driver of disruptive innovation (Sarasvathy, 2001, 2008). Causation (i.e. causal logic) 
focuses on the predictable aspects of an uncertain future.  It shares a similar concept with the rational 
decision-making model that is appropriate under conditions of low complexity and low time pressure 
(see Rahman and De Feis, 2009). Its underlying logic is: to the extent we can predict the future, we 
can control it. In this approach, firms conduct strategic planning and market research, develop formal 
business plans, perform competitive analysis, and so forth. Such formalization of business practices 
influence a firm’s propensity to focus on the ‘core’, the largest size of the target market, i.e. the center 
of the bell curve of the diffusion of innovation (Rogers, 2003).  
 
Effectuation (i.e. effectual logic) explains how artifacts (e.g. products, firms, markets) come to be 
rather than assuming their pre-existence. It assumes a set of means (who you are, what you know, and 
whom you know) as given and unalterable, and focuses on selection between possible effects that can 
be created with that set of means (Sarasvathy, 2001, 2003; Wiltbank et al., 2006). It advocates 
affordable loss rather than expected return, alliances rather than merely competition, exploiting 
contingencies rather than exploiting pre-existing knowledge, and controlling an unpredictable future 
rather than predicting an uncertain one. It rests on the logic: to the extent we can control the future, we 
do not need to predict it. It serves the ‘periphery’ rather than the core of the market, where flexibility, 
playfulness, experimentation, and mistakes are tolerated. This body of work has been developed by 
the group of researchers led by Sarasvathy under the name of “effectuation”, which builds upon 
Herbert Simon’s work on boundedly-rational decision making model (see also Rahman and De Feis, 
2009). 
 
Established firms – with their accumulated knowledge, resources, and networks in the market – are 
typical adopters of causal logic as these organizational slack provide an incentive to ‘predict’ the 
market as a way of dealing with uncertainty (Sarasvathy, 2008). The possession of these assets 
 induces top management to predict the market, regardless of whether a market exists or not (Miller 
and Chen, 1996). Not only is this logic feasible in dealing with already-existing market for 
incumbents but it is also often a compulsory logic-in-use as the firms are held accountable by their 
external stakeholders such as investors and government. In other words, institutional-political forces 
compel incumbents to adopt such logic. 
 
In contrast, start-ups and informal entrepreneurs (i.e. individuals and innovating communities) that do 
not operate within the framework of a formal, established organization, are the natural adopters of 
effectual logic since this is often the only feasible way of navigating the market in the face of liability 
of smallness (Aldrich and Auster, 1986) and newness (Stinchcombe, 1965).  
 
Evidence from the literature suggests that both logics work within a certain boundary condition and 
are susceptible to different types of error. Over reliance on the core and largest size of the target 
market (from the inference of causation) can lead to myopia in the market (Gilbert, 2003; Zhou, Yim, 
and Tse, 2005) and cause Type 2 error, which is the error of failing to observe a difference when in 
truth there is one (thus indicating a test of poor sensitivity), and ultimately failure. Too much a focus 
on the periphery of the market (from the logic of effectuation) may lead to over-trust (Goel and Karri, 
2006), inefficiency, and slower rate of growth than a firm’s true potential. Depending on how a firm 
evolves and learns, there can be a transition period where a firm gradually shifts from effectual to 
causal logic as experience, resources, and market develop (Sarasvathy, 2008). This portrayal of the 
gradual shift from effectual to causal logic resonates with Schumpeter’s description of innovative 
entrepreneurship (1939) in the early to mature stage of railway development in the United States. 
Evidence of both logics is also implied in the following quote from Christensen, Craig and Hart (2001: 
87) on the renowned Sony Corporation:  
 
Until the 1970s, Sony’s product launch decisions were strongly guided by its chief 
executive officer, Akio Morita, who followed his intuition rather than conducting careful 
market research to unearth the potential new products (showing evidence of effectual 
logic). But as the company became huge and successful in the 1980s, it had to hone its 
good management practices in market research, planning, budgeting, and resource 
allocation (showing the evidence of using causal logic). These careful, rational 
processes, which are crucial to an established company’s efficient operation, prevented 
one of history’s successful ‘serial disrupters’ from succeeding at new market creation. 
 
The over-reliance on causal logic is well illustrated in Christensen’s example of the replacement of 
hard-drive manufacturer Seagate in the advent of 3.5 inch architecture. Apparently, Seagate’s 
marketing department responded with extensive information indicating that the new product’s market 
and margin were small. Consequently, the top executives at Seagate forego this opportunity (Reed and 
DiFillippi, 1990). 
  
How IBM/ AT&T versus Nokia responded to the same type of opportunity is another interesting 
example. In the case of IBM, the limit of causal logic was evident when the firm hired a leading 
consulting firm to gauge the size of the emerging minicomputer market. The study showed nil 
opportunity for IBM. Five years later, minicomputers became a multi-billion dollar business (Gilbert, 
2003). In the mid 1980s, AT&T commissioned a leading consulting firm to conduct in-depth market 
research on the emerging cell phone market. The study concluded that this is a very small market and 
recommended AT&T to pull out of the cell phone market. Apparently, further development of cell 
phone technology primarily by Nokia led to the development of cell phones with reliable coverage at 
reasonable price points, which later disrupted the land-line phones (Govindarajan and Kopalle, 2006). 
In both examples, causal logic obviously confined the behavior and focus of the firms and their top 
executives to the core of the market, leading them to make Type 2 error. 
 
Our basic premise is that each logic adopted will influence many aspects of the firm, including how 
resources are used, which strategic direction is taken, which capabilities are developed, which markets 
are targeted, when to enter new markets and launch new innovations, how the organization and its 
operations are structured, and such forth. Effectuation and causation thus serve as the operating 
philosophy of how a firm interacts with its environment. 
 
Effectuation as a practice is in line with the philosophy underpinning design-driven innovation, an 
emerging body of work by Verganti and colleagues (see, Verganti, 2009; Dell’Era and Verganti 2009, 
2010), that emphasizes the importance of the designers (as individuals and firms) who radically 
innovate what things mean. The design driven innovation does not take into account of what 
consumers currently want or tell what they want (i.e. does not adopt causation approach), but rather 
using the stimuli and sensing what extant products means to consumers and making proposals to 
create or alter the meanings about possible new products that people have not realized they would 
need or that they were eventually just waiting for. When the product meanings are radically changed 
or re-interpreted, the design of a product may radically change too, which may lead to products with 
disruptive innovation characteristics. The process of proposing breakthrough meanings relies on 
external interpreters (including firms, researchers, designers, and artists) who show similar interests 
in the same problem: to understand the evolution of socio-cultural models and technologies, and 
propose new visions and meanings. This culturally-driven approach to innovating has its roots in the 
studies and practices of design and originates from the successful innovation practices in Italian 
design-intensive manufacturers such as Alessi, Artemide, and Kartell. We believe that while design 
driven innovation does not absolutely guarantees the creation of (low-cost) disruptive innovation, it 
clearly enhances the chances of generating disruptive products in the market. Apple’s phenomenal 
success with iPhone 4 can be, partly, attributed to the use of design-centric innovation that relies on 
effectuation strategy and whereby many technical and cultural interpreters reside within the firm. 
 
 We argue that the adoption of the effectual or causal logic may be influenced by the age and size of 
the firm. As a small, new entrant grows larger, there is a natural tendency for its top management to 
switch towards more on causal logic; however, start-ups enter the market and usually rely more on 
effectual logic. This transition of logic-in-use along firm’s growth lays the foundation for the next 
clash of market logics and consequently, the next disruptive innovation. The process repeats itself in 
the subsequent periods. Arguably, firms that embrace contradictions (i.e. maintaining a balance 
between effectual and causal logic) will be better adapted to possible disruptive threats. We therefore 
conclude: 
 
Proposition 1a:  
Disruptive innovation phenomenon is driven by the clash between effectual and causal logics 
in the market.  
 
Proposition 1b:  
Incumbents are more likely to be the adopters of causal logic than new entrants. 
Consequently, incumbents are more likely to overlook potential disruptive threats that 
encroach the market from the periphery. 
 
Proposition 1c:  
Disruptive innovators are more likely to be the adopters of effectual rather than causal logic. 
 
Proposition 1d:  
Incumbents that adopt both effectual and causal logics are less likely to be replaced by 
competitors and new entrants.  
 
Entrepreneurial Luck  
 
Serendipity, luck, or chance is ubiquitous in the history of entrepreneurship. The success of Honda in 
the US motorcycle market was accidental (Mintzberg et al., 1996). So is the emergence and success of 
Linux. The role of luck has been acknowledged by scholars in strategic management (Barney, 1986; 
Reed and DiFillippi, 1990), evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Nelson, 1991), and 
organization ecology (Hannan and Freeman, 1977), etc. More recent evidence of luck can be found 
among ‘accidental’ entrepreneurs/innovators in the domain of lead-user innovation in which 
individuals happen upon an idea through their own use, then share it with others and, finally 
commercialize it across various industries (see Christensen, Olesen, and  Kjaer, 2005; Shah and 
Tripsas, 2007).  
 
The entrepreneurship literature makes a clear distinction between uncertainty and risk (Knight, 1921; 
Wiltbank et al., 2006). Luck and chance exist due to the presence of Knightian uncertainty. It is akin 
to calculating the probability of drawing a blue ball from a jar containing unknown number of colors 
 of balls and unknown numbers of balls. Thus, it is unpredictable and unknowable. This is obviously 
different from risk that is calculable and predictable.  
 
Despite the above description of luck, our framework of disruptive innovation does not rest upon the 
notion of pure chance. Rather, we view luck as a situation which favors the prepared and capable 
minds. Luck can strike only firms who happen to be prepared to seize it when an opportunity presents 
itself. In our theoretical framework, disruptive innovation is a phenomenon characterized by 
Knightian uncertainty whose occurrence cannot be predicted in advance by incumbents and new 
entrants alike. Potential trajectories of the market consist of an unknown number of combinations and 
permutations, many of which cannot be predicted since they require the recombination with yet to be 
known knowledge/invention prior to the emergence of the next invention (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 
2004). Therefore, the technological search space may be infinite. By default, this creates Knightian 
uncertainty. 
 
At the firm level, interdependent architectures (Ulrich, 1995) often cause a situation where something 
depends on something else. This is another source of Knightian uncertainty. For instance, in early 
mainframe computers, the logic of circuitry could not be designed until the operating system was 
designed; the operating system could not be designed until the core memory was designed; and, the 
core memory could not be designed till the logic of circuitry had been designed (Christensen, 
Verlinden, and Westerman, 2002: 962). This is similar to the interlinkages of systems and sub-
systems that are highly inter-related (Ethiraj and Levinthal, 2004). At the other level, customer 
preference for new products based on the potential technological trajectories is also often unknowable 
before the market for the products is clearly defined and develops; but, this can be known after it 
happens. The high mortality rate of start-ups has something to say about the role of chance as much as 
capability in replacing resource-rich, highly experienced, and highly networked incumbents. Formally, 
 
Proposition 1e:  
Disruptive opportunity is ex ante unknown and unknowable to both existing incumbents and 
new entrants.  
 
Proposition 1f:  
Despite the appearance of luck or pure chance, specialist firms that have high degree of 
expertise and unique set of assets are more likely to become disruptive innovators than other 
firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Product-Level Drivers 
 
Evolutionary product morphology: adaptation and exaptation  
 
The evolutionary view, owing its roots in the evolutionary theory of natural selection, is a growing 
theme of research in entrepreneurship and is relevant to explain disruptive innovation. The 
evolutionary process can be categorized into (i) historical genesis: features built by natural selection 
for their present role, and (ii) current utility: features now enhancing fitness no matter how they arose 
(Gould and Vrba, 1982; Gould, 2002).  
 
The former is associated with the primary product of the evolutionary process (or naturally selected 
features (adaptations)). That is, markets and firms create selective pressures for the adaptation of 
products in the direction of demand-side factors, such as customer needs, and supply-side factors, 
such as production efficiencies. Products that are selected in the process will be retained, diffused, and 
even imitated (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
 
The latter is the by-product of the evolutionary process (i.e. exaptation) and residue of noise (i.e. 
spandrels) (Lewin, 1982; Buss et al., 1998). For example, the feathers of birds are believed to be 
evolved mechanisms for thermal regulation; however, over time the feathers appeared to have been 
co-opted for a different function – flight (Lewin, 1982). These by-products emerge because selection 
mechanisms do not always guarantee optimal design (Buss et al., 1998).  
 
Exaptation, a feature co-opted for its present role for new purposes but not an adaptation for its 
current function, is an important concept in the emerging paradigm of evolutionary entrepreneurship 
(Dew et al., 2004). The history of entrepreneurship has revealed evidence of exaptation that causes 
disruption in the market (see Dew et al., 2004; Dew et al., 2008). For example, the CD-ROM was 
designed originally for digital-to-optical recording and playback system but was co-opted later for 
data storage. Edison’s phonograph, designed originally as a dictating machine, was co-opted as 
jukebox. These two inventions formed the basis of the music industry. Other examples include the co-
optation of laser, agricultural tractors and many others. Viagra’s success came from exaptation of 
drugs for the treatment of heart problems into male-enhancement substance. These real world 
examples suggest that exaptation and its residue can be the potential sources of disruptive 
opportunities. Furthermore, they might generate higher disruptive potential than the conventional 
historical genesis (i.e. primary product of technological evolution). 
 
The competing forces between adaptation (i.e. Darwinian natural selection) and exaptation (i.e. the 
by-product of unintentional natural selection) create instabilities and disequilibria that result in 
Knightian uncertainty in the trajectory of the market. We thus suggest that the clash between the two 
main morphologies of evolutionary processes is an important causal mechanism that leads to 
disruptive innovation. Formally, 
  
Proposition 2a:  
The clash between adaptation and exaptation forces in product forms is an important driver 
of disruptive innovation.  
 
More specifically, we propose that: 
 
Proposition 2b:  
Exaptation process is more effective in generating disruptive innovation than adaptation 
process.  
 
Consumer-Level Drivers 
 
User-innovators and innovative consumers  
 
The lead-user literature suggests that lead users and their communities are important sources of 
innovation opportunities (Von Hippel, 1986, 2005; Schreier and Prügl, 2008). Lead users can be 
individuals who act as entrepreneurial innovators informally (see Chandra and Coviello, 2010) as well 
as organizations/firms as a formal entity. Together with consumers who take risks, be proactive and 
innovative in their mindsets in adopting new products (i.e. innovative consumers), they co-evolve 
with firms in determining technological and market trajectories. These entities are the co-designers of 
the evolutionary product morphology (discussed earlier) and are important mechanisms of disruption.  
 
‘Sticky’ information often impedes existing incumbents from knowing precisely what their consumers 
want particularly for novel artifacts (Polanyi, 1958; Von Hippel, 1998). Lead-user innovators, their 
innovating communities, and innovative consumers possess distinct advantages in understanding the 
tacit and continuously evolving customer preference and therefore, can influence the preference 
formations (Carpenter and Nakamoto, 1994) and trajectories of technologies that have the potential 
for causing disruption but are not in the radar of incumbents. 
 
The philosophy of lead-user innovation shares commonality with the concept “collective intelligence” 
(Stinchcombe, 1965; Sulis, 1997; Bonabeau and Dorigo, 1999). Prior studies show that collective 
intelligence offers advantages not only for man-made organizations but also for animal organizations. 
These include the power of collective mind in organizing aircraft carrier flight decks (Weick, 1979; 
Weick and Roberts, 1993) and ‘creative collectives’ in problem solving at work (Hargadon and 
Bechky, 2006). In a study of social animal behavior, evidence shows that systems adopting collective 
intelligence tend to be more efficient in generating solutions to problems (Bonabeau et al., 2000).  
 
A system that adopts collective intelligence may face fewer threats to disruptive innovation since new 
innovative ideas are involved and co-opted in the co-innovation activities and gain economic benefits 
from being a part of the creative collectives. The practice of design-driven innovation eventually 
 relies on collective intelligence logic, in which the design intensive firms solicit external interpreters 
(e.g. firms, researchers, designers, developers, artists, etc) who can propose new meanings to a 
product. For instance, Apple’s phenomenal success with iPhone can be, partly, attributed to the 
networks of external applications (or “apps”) developers who create an ecosystem of apps (see Sorrel, 
2010) that offers a wide degree of product assortments for Apple that cater to the heterogeneity of 
user needs. These external developers work together as virtual teams among each other (Ratcheva, 
2008) are critical to Apple’s technological networks to-date. Google’s strengths is well attributed to 
its systematic search and acquisition of ideas and innovation opportunities from external, individual 
IT programmers around the world.  These two firms have been able to protect themselves from the 
threats of disruptive innovation by embracing the external creative collectives in their business model.  
 
The body of work in lead-user innovation reported in the literature contains an extensive array of 
evidence showing that lead-users only tend to generate incremental innovation (e.g. the case of 3M 
innovation†, see Lillien et al., 2002; for banking services, see Oliveira and Von Hippel, 2011), or 
creating new niche markets from ground up that do not disrupt any existing markets/technologies (e.g. 
mountain bike, Lüthje et al., 2005; kite surfing, see Von Hippel, 2005). More recently, the popular 
press reported that user-based design will result in average products, that might satisfy users, but will 
not delight them (see Denning, 2011). But is this really the case? While the evidence seems to be 
convincing, we argue that there has been misrepresentation in terms how the lead user was defined, 
and how the lead user studies were conducted and reported. User innovator often turns into user 
entrepreneur (see Chandra and Coviello, 2010; Shah and Tripsas, 2007), and later create new venture 
and become full-time entrepreneur as soon as they recognize the commercial attractiveness of the 
innovation. The entire body of lead-user innovation research focuses on individuals and the 
communities of people who are currently classified as lead users. Those who are previously a lead 
user in their life, and then eventually created/discovered blockbuster opportunity and disrupted the 
marketplace are missing in the peer-reviewed journals and popular press. Moreover, the opportunity 
development process, including those for disruptive innovation, does not happen overnight (see 
Chandra, Styles and Wilkinson, 2011), as it can take years, along the users or firm’s life cycle. By the 
time the opportunity becomes truly disruptive, the lead users may have turned into a full time 
entrepreneurs operating under a formal organization. Thus, it appears that lead user innovations are 
never really disruptive and lead users are not disruptive innovators.  
 
Borrowing the idea from user innovation/entrepreneurship research (see Chandra and Coviello, 2010 
and Shah and Tripsas, 2007), we could define Mark Zuckerberg (the founder of Facebook), Sergey 
Brin and Larry Page (the founders of Google) and Pierre Omidyar (the founder of eBay) as lead users 
                                                 
† Although Lead User idea generation in 3M generates more than eight times higher than forecast sales for 
average contemporaneously ‘traditional’ product, it is only generating $146 million after five years. We do not 
consider this to be an exceptional commercial success. 
 in their own respective fields who create disruptive innovations with both exceptional technological 
and commercial success (i.e. the lead user techies in social networking site, search engine, and online 
auction system, respectively). In other words, the definitional and sampling issues obscure the 
performance outcome of lead user innovation. 
 
We argue that lead user innovation does not absolutely lead to either incremental or disruptive 
innovation. This depends on whether the lead user innovation contains so-called competence 
enhancing or competence destroying‡ characteristics to the focal firm and other firms (see Gatignon et 
al., 2002). Lead user innovations that contain competence destroying characteristic are more likely to 
transform into disruptive innovation, while those that contain competence enhancing properties are 
more likely to transform into incremental innovation. From this lens, one could argue that Google 
creates a competence destroying innovation in the market – by creating powerful algorithms for 
making effective search on the internet, which wipes out the majority of the predecessor search 
engines. So is the case with Facebook’s competence destroying innovation that ultimately eliminates 
most of the predecessor social networking sites for the general public. 
 
Therefore, our framework considers the role of lead user innovation and the characteristics of the 
innovation (competence enhancing vs. destroying) as important influencing factors that lead to 
disruptive innovation. This offers strategies for general managers to ensure corporate longevity.  
 
The above arguments lead to our next propositions: 
 
Proposition 3a:  
Lead user innovation that contains competence destroying characteristics is an important 
driver of disruptive innovation. 
 
Proposition 3b: Firms that embrace collective intelligence in the innovation process, 
including lead user innovation that contains competence destroying characteristics, are more 
likely to create disruptive innovation in the market. 
 
Firm, Consumer, and Product Level Drivers 
 
Opportunity Tournament 
 
In the preceding section, we highlighted the role of Knightian uncertainty (true uncertainty) and luck 
in the process of disruptive innovation. Recent research on innovation tournaments (see Terwiesch 
and Ulrich, 2009; Terwiesch and Xu, 2008; Kornish and Ulrich, forthcoming) demonstrate why and 
how firms can engineer the innovation process to find the best ideas out of the hundreds or thousands 
                                                 
‡ Competence enhancing innovation reinforces and build upon existing competencies, skills and know-how; 
while competence destroying innovation obsolesces and overturns existing competencies, skills and know-how 
(see Gatignon et al., 2002, p.1107) 
 of ideas submitted by individual contestants. What innovation contest does is that it generates a wide 
variance of new ideas and use judges from the target market to assess the viability of each idea. In 
other words, the contest allows the firm to enhance their ‘luck’ or increase their probability of finding 
the next disruptive innovation opportunity more effectively and efficiently.  
 
We use the term Opportunity Tournament here (rather than innovation tournament/contest) to 
encompass a wider range of opportunities because ideas themselves may not necessarily be tangible 
innovation themselves, some or many still require further refinement before they become disruptive 
opportunity. Research by Ulrich and colleagues has focused on the ‘ideation and selection stage’ as 
being critical in the innovation tournament. From an entrepreneurial lens, ‘disruptive’ opportunities 
often require further development before they can be selected and turned into exceptional market and 
commercial success. Hence, in keeping with the entrepreneurial theme in this conceptual framework, 
we label the process as opportunity tournaments. 
 
Opportunity tournaments have been used by various large organizations, from Deloite Innovation 
Quest, American Idol, InnoCentive, QVC product road show, to DARPA Grand Challenge for 
autonomous robot vehicles, to survive and thrive in the market. It helps the firm to create more 
chances of generating disruptive opportunities to stay as market leader while at the same time 
protecting themselves from being disrupted by competitors/new entrants who commercialize the 
disruptive opportunities in the market. While academic research in this domain has only begun to 
spring, firms have taken an earlier plunge into the opportunity tournament and generated blockbuster 
opportunity and commercial success. 
 
This leads to our final proposition: 
 
Proposition 4: Firms that embrace opportunity tournaments in their innovation process are more 
likely to generate disruptive innovation. 
 
To illustrate the framework advanced in this paper, we draw on one of the most exciting yet on-going 
battles in the mini computing device market: the first netbook versus iPad, and next, iPad versus 
Chromebooks. ASUSTek pioneered the netbook market with Eee PC in late 2007, aiming at users 
who require a light weight and a relatively low cost second computing device. Other major players in 
the computer industry including Acer, HP, and Dell jumped into the market by developing their Eee 
PC-like netbooks in the twinkling of an eye. In April 2010, Apple entered the second computing 
device market by launching iPad. Apple embraced “who I am, what I know, whom I know,” 
principles from effectuation strategy, i.e. drawing on existing core competences and resources in iPod 
and iPhone, and transformed them into a line of tablet computers. The outcome of the effectuation 
strategy was clear: iPad consequently drained rivals’ (e.g. Acer, Asus) resources from the netbook 
market and ate up a significant portion of the netbook market (Guardian 11/04/2011). Before too long, 
 Acer and Asus retaliated by analyzing iPad’s trajectory and ended up copying iPad’s features, a 
strategic choice infused with “causation” strategy. But the situation did not look any brighter for Acer 
and Asus. Before too long, Google came into the scene. In May 2011, Google relies on effectual logic 
(by leveraging “who I am, what I know, whom I know”) drawing on existing core competence and 
resources in its web-based computing including cloud-based computing and launched Chromebooks, 
a product which does not really require the hardware and software as commonly found in iPad and 
notebooks (BBC News 11/05/2011). Google went further by ‘internalizing’ external user innovators 
and communities. Many of the best user innovators in web-based computing are scouted and hired to 
work for Google and given the freedom and resources to work as if the hires were their own 
entrepreneurs. Hence, Google has been practicing “opportunity tournaments” consciously or/and 
unconsciously. The entire suite of strategies mentioned helps Google in launching disruptive 
innovation in the market and reduces the chances for Google to be disrupted by new entrants. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article advances our understanding of disruptive innovation and underlines the relevance and 
potential contribution of entrepreneurship research to the disruptive innovation research. It integrates 
recent developments in the theories of effectuation, evolutionary entrepreneurship, lead-users, 
collective intelligence, and opportunity tournament, and reconceptualizes disruptive innovation as a 
co-evolutionary entrepreneurial process at the firm, product, and consumer level. It offers a theoretical 
framework of disruptive innovation and advances a set of testable propositions. The proposed 
framework explains conditions and mechanism that enhance the likelihood of an entity to create 
disruptive innovation, and to protect itself from being disrupted by start-ups/competitors.  
 
The role of decision-making logic (effectual versus causal) and evolutionary morphology (exaptation 
versus adaptation) are critical drivers of disruptive innovation since they influence firms’ mindsets, 
ways of doing things, and strategies. These recent developments have been confined to the 
entrepreneurship research streams. Little efforts have been made to study the impact of these business 
logics and evolutionary forces on disruptive innovation. The clash between the logics (effectuation vs. 
causation) and evolutionary morphology (exaptation vs. adaptation) is a critical condition that drives 
disruptive innovation. We suspect that disruptive opportunity may be better created by ‘controlling’ 
uncertain future through effectuation strategy (where Knightian uncertainty is assumed) than 
‘predicting’ the uncertainty via causation strategy (where risk is assumed). Importantly, exaptation 
can be a much more influential driver to generate potential sources of disruptive opportunity than 
adaptation. Exaptation generates variance in the quality of innovation and hence enhancing the 
chances of creating ‘outliers’ that may turn into exceptional technological and market/commercial 
success.  
 
 Lead-user innovation and collective intelligence literature can be fruitfully integrated into the research 
in disruptive innovation. Lead-users have been generally accepted as sources of incremental 
innovation. We argue that this characterization occurs as a result of misrepresentation of lead users, 
particularly on the way that lead users are defined and ignorance on the role of time in opportunity 
development. A number of world-class disruptive innovations in the online market (e.g. FaceBook, 
Google, eBay) were created by lead users (e.g. Zuckerberg; Brin and Page; and Omidyar, respectively) 
but these have been missing in the picture because lead users eventually evolve and transform into 
formal entrepreneurs and their organizations grow into world’s largest companies. Critically, lead user 
innovation does not absolutely or simply lead to incremental or disruptive innovation. We argue that 
this depends on whether the lead users generate competence-destroying, which is likely to create 
disruptive innovation; or competence-enhancing innovations, which is likely to turn into incremental 
innovation. 
 
Opportunity tournament is a more recent strategy that has shown to enhance firm’s innovation 
performance and a critical driver of disruptive innovation. This approach has turned innovation from 
largely an uncontrollable activity or even an art into a scientific process of creating and selecting the 
most promising opportunities. Its strength lies in the generation of a wide variance of quality of 
innovation opportunities, and hence the higher chances of discovering the outliers or highly disruptive 
innovation with exceptional commercial opportunities. Since not all disruptive opportunities are born 
overnight (e.g. Google’s search engine opportunity took some time to develop and refine before it 
becomes disruptive), the role of nurturing and cultivation of the initial disruptive opportunity cannot 
be ignored.  
 
We believe that disruptive innovation may be better studied and understood from an holistic 
entrepreneurial lens, by looking at the interactions of multi-level factors (i.e. firm, product, and 
consumer). In so doing, we demonstrate that entrepreneurial perspective is a fruitful avenue of 
enquiry that will help advance knowledge in disruptive innovation.  
 
Avenues for future research are multi-fold. First, future research may be undertaken by empirically 
examining the propositions advanced in the paper. Large scale quantitative studies are well suited to 
test and explore the propositions, such as Gatignon et al. (2002). These may include constructs that 
measure the presence or absence of effectual logic and action vs. causation for both disruptive and 
incremental innovators; assessment of CEOs and general managers’ view of the nature of uncertainty 
surrounding disruptive innovation in their respective industry; examination of exaptation vs. 
adaptation forces in the industry at the product-level of analysis; measurement of the nature of 
innovations generated by lead users (competence destroying vs. enhancing); to measurement of the 
effectiveness of opportunity tournaments. 
 
 Qualitative fieldwork research and structured content analysis are other viable approaches to test the 
framework proposed here (see Smith, Grimm, Gannon, and Chen, 1991; Chen and Hambrick, 1995. 
We suggest researchers to take into account the role of history of the firm and its personnel (i.e. lead 
user-ship) to make better sampling decisions when studying lead users, avoid the trap of 
misclassifying lead user innovation without an understanding of whether the innovation is 
competence destroying or enhancing, and ultimately make the valid generalization of their research. 
Since entrepreneurship is not a once-off activity but rather a continuous process along the life of an 
innovator/entrepreneur, it may be beneficial for studies of this nature to examine the dynamics of the 
disruptive opportunity development. This may help generate useful theory of the process of disruptive 
innovation  
 
Computer simulation such as agent-based modeling is another useful methodology to test and explore 
the propositions advanced in this paper. This approach can be fruitfully used to test the outcome of the 
clash between agents that operate on causal versus effectual logic, the role of luck, as well as 
exaptation (e.g. Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2006). Results from this type of research can be further 
developed into formal models of disruptive innovation that can be used for both positive and 
normative purposes. For instance, dynamic system models may be developed to test the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for the emergence of disruptive innovation (e.g. Sterman et al., 2007). The 
formal modeling may offer new insights to the disruptive innovation literature that has mostly been 
developed through conventional empirical methods.  
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGERS 
 
The proposed framework advanced in this study offers a number of strategies for CEOs and general 
managers to create and cope with disruptive innovations particularly for those operating in rapidly 
changing environment. 
 
We first highlighted the importance of effectuation and causation strategies. Disruptive innovation can 
be seen as the clash between existing technologies and firms with new technologies and firms who 
disrupt them and at a more extreme case, replaces them altogether. This clash begins with different 
business logic-in-use by the market players. If all firms adopt causation, then there would be fewer 
and less frequent upheavals in the market since every firm will focus on developing artifacts with 
characteristics that are already generally adopted/accepted as the status quo (near the centre of the bell 
curve). Imagine that all firms conduct surveys to predict the general market needs. If this really 
happens, then there will be no iPhone 4s or Samsung Galaxy 2 today with features that are 
unimaginable by the standard mobile phone design. These phones have become the trendsetter smart 
phone with never-seen-before features. The fact that Apple relies heavily on effectuation (and a form 
 of design-driven innovation, see Verganti, 2009; Dell’Era and Verganti, 2009, 2010) says a lot about 
the virtue of effectuation principles to enhance the chances of creating the next disruptive innovation. 
 
One of the strategies to remain as disruptive innovators is to embrace effectuation principles along the 
firms life cycle, as what Apple, Google, and Facebook has been doing all along. The techie-leaders of 
these firms (e.g. Steve Jobs; Sergey Brin and Larry Page; and Mark Zuckerberg, respectively) 
dominate and influence the corporate culture such that the firms remain as the natural adopters of 
effectuation in their business practices and specifically in product design, despite that the firms have 
grown into large incumbents. The failures of many market leaders of the past could be seen as the 
result of myopic view of their CEOs and general managers of the potential threats from the periphery. 
As is the case with Sony Corporation, it fell into the trap of becoming overly driven by causation 
rather than effectuation strategy or a balance of both. 
 
Predicting which artifacts or design will turn into the next disruptive innovation is not an easy task 
due to the presence of Knightian uncertainty (unknown and unknowable conditions) of plausible 
product/design features combinations and permutations. Apple or Google has no way of predicting 
which of their artifacts would disrupt the market ex-ante. But this can be known after it happens. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of strategies, in addition to effectuation/causation and the role of 
luck, that firms can adopt to create and cope with disruptive innovation, as discussed next. 
 
From the product level, firms could explore ways to harness exaptation strategies. While the 
evolutionary entrepreneurship literature shows examples of truly accidental innovations, we believe 
the exaptation process can be engineered and embedded into a firm’s innovation practices. Viagra’s is 
a great lesson for CEOs and general managers on how products can be engineered using exaptation 
strategy into a blockbuster drug with exceptional medical and commercial success. The hand-motion 
sensor technology used in Nintendo Wii’s remote control is a form of exaptation of using a design 
differently from its original purpose (i.e. originally used for television remote control), and led to 
enormous success of Wii which sold for more than 86 million units since its introduction in 2006 (see 
Takahashi, 2011). Using the exaptation strategy, firms can find new plausible ways of better use or 
new use or alternative use of their products and designs. Compared to the adaptation process in new 
product development, the exaptation process is more likely to increase the variance of the quality of 
the ideas and hence discovering outliers or extreme type of design and features, or selecting the best 
one(s). The clash between the product morphology (exaptation vs. adaptation) is crucial for the 
emergence of disruptive innovation.  
 
Lead user innovation is an effective approach for leveraging outsiders and tap into their innovative 
ideas. Although the literature tends to report only the incremental innovation potential of lead users, 
we argue that the literature has overlooked the lead users such as the founders of Facebook, Google, 
and eBay who created disruptive innovation with phenomenal success. While there is no shortcut or 
 quick therapy to generate highly disruptive lead user innovation, firms can work collaboratively with 
lead users to produce designs/artifacts/products that have the competence destroying characteristics 
(rather than competence enhancing ones). Since the disruptive opportunity is not a once-off event but 
involves opportunity development and further refinement processes, firms can guide and finance lead 
users to focus on opportunities that are competence-destroying.  
 
Companies can leverage the communities of users of their products and learn to distinguish and 
reward top ideas and artifacts through company-based initiatives or even leveraging external online 
platforms that focus on this. A recent example is the Innocentive, an online platform developed by Eli 
Lilly, which allows a company to ask people in the communities of experts to solve a particular 
technological problem for a financial reward. Lego, for instance, cleverly leveraged the intelligence 
and resources of its communities of users (customers) to develop new robot games at much lower 
costs and faster development cycle (see Von Hippel, 2005).  
 
Last but not least, firms can adopt opportunity tournaments to create and select exceptional 
opportunities. Research has demonstrated that the higher the variance of the quality of 
ideas/opportunities generated, the more likely that the exceptional or outlier ideas/opportunities will 
be generated. While discovering innovation has been thought of as an art or relies entirely on luck, the 
opportunity tournament strategy offers a scientific approach to finding the disruptive opportunities 
and turns them into reality. General managers can learn from American Idol and Pixar to find their 
next best blockbuster products. 
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 TABLE 1 
 A Survey of the Disruptive Innovation Literature 
Authors & year 
DI as a supply-
side phenomenon 
DI as a demand-
side phenomenon 
Key factors influencing disruptive innovation Link to entrepreneurship 
Christensen and 
Bower (1996); 
Christensen (1997) 
√ √ 
(1) Cognitive failures in the top level managers; (2) Existing customers’ 
demand shapes the allocation of resources in technological innovation, 
which in turn leads to under-investment in simpler technologies for 
emerging customers. 
Causation as the sole mode of reasoning for firms may be too 
limited; 
The influence of entrepreneurial customers in the society are under 
estimated. 
Christensen, 
Verlinden and 
Westerman (2002) 
√ √ 
Degree of firm’s vertical integration or disintegration and whether 
customers are under/over served by the functionality of products in the 
market. 
Entrepreneurship influences a firm’s organizational structure and in 
turn its flexibility to compete with new entrants; 
Entrepreneurial customers may be under-served. 
Adner (2002) - √ 
Consumers’ marginal utility from performance improvement dictates their 
willingness to pay for product enhancements and the relationship between 
performance overlap and symmetry. 
n/a 
Adner and Zemsky 
(2006) 
 
- √ 
Decreasing marginal utility and consumer heterogeneity across market 
segments affect the sustainability of competitive advantage of firms. 
n/a 
Christensen, Suárez 
and Utterback (1998) 
√ - 
Firms that target new market segments with an architectural innovation will 
tend to be more successful than those that target existing markets or 
innovate in component technology. 
The performance implications of Entrepreneurial Orientation. 
Anderson and 
Tushman (1990) 
√ - 
Technological variation, selection, and retention through organizational 
dynamics. 
Entrepreneurial dynamics, trial/error/improvisation, and 
entrepreneurial sense making as a way of understanding the world. 
Tripsas (1997) √ - 
The interaction between incumbents’ investment in developing new 
technologies, technical capabilities, and ability to appropriate the benefits 
of technological innovation through specialized assets. 
The role of firms prior knowledge on subsequent entrepreneurial 
discovery; 
Tradeoffs between effectuation vs. causation influence allocation of 
resources and capability development. 
Henderson and Clark 
(1990) 
 
√ - 
Existing organizations are more likely to fail facing with architectural 
innovation, which requires a reconfiguration of existing organizational and 
technological capabilities to pursue. 
Tradeoffs between Effectuation vs. Causation influence firms’ 
strategic directions and dynamic capabilities. 
 Chandy and Tellis 
(2000) 
√ - 
Incumbents’ curse is not always valid. Some incumbents may have (i) 
dynamic organizational climates that resemble entrepreneurial small firms 
and, (ii) strong technological capability that allows them to be aware of 
scientific breakthroughs at an early stage. 
Tradeoffs between Effectuation vs. Causation in incumbents; but, 
incumbents that embrace effectuation may ‘see’ and ‘exploit’ more 
opportunities and develop ‘alertness’ to early stage opportunities. 
Henderson (2006) √ - 
Established routines of large incumbent firms make it difficult for them to 
sense and then act on changes in customer demand. 
The role of prior knowledge on entrepreneurial competence; the use 
of causation as the sole strategic advantage by incumbents may be 
too limited. 
Markides (2006) √ - 
Redefinition of what an existing product or service and how it is provided 
to customers (i.e. business model) and creation of new-to-the-world 
products driven by supply-push force (i.e. radical product). 
The relevance of Schumpeterian rather than Kirznerian 
entrepreneurship. 
Utterback and Acee 
(2005) 
√ - 
High performing and high priced technology is introduced to the most 
demanding established market segments and later moves toward the mass 
market. 
n/a 
Rao, Angelov and 
Nov (2006) 
√ - 
Disruptive innovation needs not necessarily be inferior in quality. 
Technological convergence, by recombining incremental innovations, can 
become disruptive (e.g. VOIP and P2P computing = Skype). 
The relevance of Schumpeterian rather than Kirznerian 
entrepreneurship. 
Zeng and Williamson 
(2007) 
√ - 
Cost innovation from emerging markets targeting at low-end segments of 
developed markets in novel ways (e.g. China’s manufacturer in electronics, 
computers, medical diagnostics, automotives, etc.). 
Exploitation of cross border entrepreneurial advantage 
 Figure 1 
Disruptive Innovation as a co-evolutionary entrepreneurial process: 
A theoretical framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
